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Introduction: A Complex Relationship 
 
When discussing the relationship between human rights 
and the conflict cycle, one may question whether any 
relationship between the two is possible apart from an 
inherently contradictory one. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights emphasises at the outset the notion that 
human rights and peace are inextricably linked: 
 
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world” 
 
Thus, if human rights is the foundation upon which peace 
is built does it not follow that violent conflict is a denial of 
human rights in itself? The inclusion of peace as a human 
right has not yet attained legal status and definition38 
although most human rights treaties and programmes of 
action make explicit or implicit references to peace as a 
component of - or  even a pre-requisite for - a human rights 
culture. If one were to adopt the thesis that peace is a human 
right, naturally there can be no possible dialectic between 
peace and the conflict cycle except to state that violent 
conflict is a breach of human rights and thus should be 
eliminated. Such a response, however, evades the 
                                                 
38 On peace as a human right see, inter alia, Roche, D. (2003)  The Human 
Right to Peace. Ottawa, Novalis. 
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fundamental reality that violent conflicts do exist and that 
condemning them or wishing them away will not necessarily 
yield any positive result. 
 
The adoption of a human rights approach to the conflict 
cycle, I contend, may provide guidance as to how to respond 
to the threat of violent conflict, its containment when it 
erupts and also its resolution. While it would be foolish to 
prescribe a rights-based approach as a panacea to all the 
maladies associated with violent conflict, it is worth 
assessing the contribution that such an approach may provide 
to conflict studies. The realisation that human rights 
principles have a role to play within the conflict arena has 
led practitioners and academics away from a purely 
adversarial conception of the relationship between conflict 
(as well as conflict resolvers) and human rights (as well as 
human rights advocates). 
 
It is now clear that the stereotypical portrayal of human 
rights advocates as moralising and mindless actors ready to 
derail a peace process for the sake of human rights principles 
on the one hand; and the depiction of conflict resolvers as 
unprincipled, pragmatist protagonists of shady deals 
involving unsavoury characters on the other hand, are both 
equally deceptive. The reality is more complex; a complexity 
that is in keeping with the difficulties inherent in conflict and 
human rights themselves. One of the central tenets of this 
paper is that a broader understanding of human rights, 
eschewing a purely legalistic and litigious interpretation, 
may prove to be a useful tool in bridging divides, combating 
monochromatic identities and normalising post-conflict 
societies. 
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Such a broad understanding of human rights allows 
conflict resolvers to view the human rights agenda as a 
complementary one to the conflict resolution one. It also 
allows human rights advocates to conceptualise their work in 
conflict resolution as an ongoing, long-term project that may 
and should use methods other than courts and tribunals in 
achieving their aims. The role of human rights education in 
this context is of particular relevance. 
 
These considerations, as well as others, have made it 
possible for academics and practitioners to take a nuanced, 
versatile and balanced approach in defining the relationship 
between human rights and conflict: 
 
“The relationship between conflict management and 
resolution on the one hand, and human rights promotion, on 
the other, is multifaceted, intricate, and fluid, evolving in 
response not only to changes in comtemporary violent 
conflict but also to the two camps’ growing experience in 
working as partners rather than as competitors.” 39 
 
I would add that such an approach is also aided by 
changes in the understanding of human rights as suggested 
above. 
 
 
The human needs theory of conflict and the fulfilment of 
human needs as a conflict prevention measure 
 
The study of conflict and conflict resolution has evolved 
significantly since the 1950s and 1960s when conflict 
analysis and resolution emerged as a distinct academic 
                                                 
39 Mertus, J.A. and Helsing, J.W.  eds. (2006) Human Rights & Conflict. 
Washington, United States Institite for Peace Press. p. x 
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discipline. Conflict studies are now a discipline which is 
attracting more students, practitioners and academics as 
evidenced by the growing number of undergraduate and 
graduate programmes in conflict analysis and resolution. As 
conflict analysis matured as an academic discipline so, 
naturally, did the body of literature that attempts to explain 
why and how conflicts emerge and how best to resolve such 
conflicts.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the 
various conflict and conflict resolution models that have 
40. Nevertheless the 
theories which have had a significant  impact on conflict 
resolution and which are closely linked to the values, 
discourse and context of human rights deserve to be 
mentioned. 
 
In particular Edward Azar’s  theory of protracted social 
conflict  based on lack of access to human needs has strong 
linkages with the underlying rationale of human rights as a 
system which addresses the most fundamental human needs 
(such as food, health, education, political participation etc). 
This human needs theory of conflict as developed by Azar 
and John Burton amongst others is summarised by 
Wallensteen: 
 
“With the needs-based approach, it is the difficulty of 
meeting an individual’s party’s need that is the origin of the 
conflict and the key to its solution. The analysis aims at 
locating unmet needs.”41 
If we look at specific human rights discourse in this 
context we note that the cold war division between economic 
                                                 
40 For a good general overview see, inter alia, Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T. 
and Miall, H. (2005) Contemporary Conflict Resolution. 2nd ed., Cambridge, 
Polity Press. 
41 Wallensteen, P. (2007) Understanding Conflict Resolution. 2nd ed., London, 
Sage, p.41. 
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emerged over the past four decades
and social rights on the one hand and civil and political 
rights on the other re-emerges. Breaches of economic and 
social rights (mainly through discrimination in access to 
public goods) are identified in some of the literature as 
underlying causes of conflict whereas  breaches of civil and 
political rights (especially personal integrity rights) are 
considered as the immediate triggers of violent conflict. In 
fact it has been suggested that: 
 
“More often than not the relevant proximate causes are 
political, including rapid regime change and uncertainty; 
external intervention; elections; democratic transitions or 
military coups; protests or insurgent violence, which 
provoke brutal government crackdowns; and discriminatory 
policies. For our purposes it is important to note that 
underlying causes are often associated with violations of 
economic and social rights, but that proximate causes are 
more frequently linked to abuses of civil and political 
rights.”42 
 
However, a caveat should be added to this. Human rights 
violations of economic and social nature, even severe ones 
characterized by extreme poverty, do not necessarily, or even 
frequently, result in violent conflict.  As Nelson cogently 
points out: “Much of humanity has lived in acute poverty for 
most of history, but has not been in a state of chronic 
rebellion.”43 The real underlying cause of conflict in terms 
of human rights is, I suggest, the ‘discriminatorisation’ of 
relative poverty i.e. when poverty is, or is somehow 
perceived as, ‘inflicted’ on certain groups. Interpreting 
                                                 
42 Thoms, O. And Ron, J. (2007) Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal 
Conflict? Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3, August. 
43 Nelson, J. (n.d) Poverty, Inequality and Conflict in Developing Countries 
[Internet] Available from: <www.rbf.org/pdf/poverty.pdf>. 
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Thoms and Ron it appears that the most probable risk factor 
for violent conflict is a scenario where individuals within a 
group are poorer than individuals in another group because 
of their appertaining to their specific group. This poverty is 
usually relative poverty exemplified by lesser access to 
public goods. Put in simple terms, one may illustrate this risk 
factor as follows: I am poor because I am discriminated 
against and I am discriminated against because I am Hindu 
or black or Catholic etc. 
 
When this equation is internalised by the group and 
becomes part of their identity the stage is set for potential 
escalation of conflict. This internalisation of discrimination 
tends to occur as the fact of being discriminated against 
becomes part and parcel of the group identity and, indeed, 
part of the collective memory of that group. Thus, 
discrimination may serve to forge and strengthen a particular 
group identity. Once discrimination and victimhood enters 
the group’s collective memory it persists through time even 
when the actual discrimination ceases. Indeed Thoms and 
Ron suggest that: 
 
 “in some cases, the truth of the matter matters less than 
popular perception. If one group has disproportionate 
control over the state, others may feel discriminated against 
because they lack a sense of participation and trust44.” 
 
This is particularly relevant in identity-based conflicts in 
the context of divided communities. These scenarios 
typically present a situation where a particular ethnic, 
religious or political group controls the resources of the state 
(through majoritarism, military repression etc.) and excludes 
the other groups within the state from access to  structures 
                                                 
44 Op. cit. Thoms and Ron (2007) 
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and benefits. This discrimination helps further forge the 
identities of the respective groups. The group in power 
perceives itself  as special and superior while the excluded 
group’s idenity is further strengthened through the 
experience of discrimination. The shared experience of 
domination on one side and the shared experience of 
suffering discrimination on the other side thus serves to 
further cement the respective identities. The re-inforcement 
of the group identity in its turn accentuates the underlying 
causes of conflict by exacerbating the polarisation of society 
and the sense of grievance of the excluded group. Thus the 
stage is set for escalation to violent conflict, once the 
discriminated group witnesses abuses of personal integrity 
rights such as police violence, arbitrary arrest, torture etc. 
This seems to indicate that  the risk of conflict increases in 
similar situations for: 
 
“If rights are denied, needs are frustrated, which creates 
a potential for violent conflict as people seek to find ways to 
address their basic needs, since these are non-negotiable.”45 
 
This sense of grievance that is created does not appear to 
be an immediate trigger for escalation to violent conflict. 
Instead, the literature suggests that it is repression that 
transforms grievance into active antagonism: 
 
“although individuals and groups may grudgingly 
tolerate economic inequality and discrimination for years, 
they are likely to respond with violence when physically 
threatened or attacked.”46 
 
                                                 
45 Op. cit. Parlevliet (2009)  p.5 
46 Goodwin, J. (2001) No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary 
Movements, Cambridge University Press. 
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Returning to the human needs theory of conflict one can 
note that addressing violations of economic and social rights 
may serve to fulfil the unmet needs while preventing 
violation of personal integrity rights could avoid conflict 
escalating into violence. Such a framework of analysis 
provides clear indications on how and where to intervene in 
conflict prevention terms. Clarity, however, does not equate 
with ease and the task of addressing abuses of human rights 
in divided societies remains a delicate and complex one. 
Essentially, professionals advising on conflict prevention in 
the context of divided societies riven by discrimination have 
the unenviable task of balancing the demand for rapid 
change from the discriminated group with the instinctive 
resistance to change of the dominant group. 
 
 
The role of humanitarian law in attenuating conflict 
repercussions 
 
The difficulties inherent in preventing violent conflict is 
evidenced by the fact that  violent conflicts continue to  erupt 
even at a time when unparalleled structures, attention and 
strategies have been devised in the field of conflict 
prevention and conflict resolution. Civil conflict, in 
particular, continues to break out at regular intervals. Once 
violent conflict breaks out, human rights are necessarily the 
first casualties of the conflict. 
 
This is widely acknowledged by states, civil society and 
international organizations such as the United Nations: 
 
“The human rights abuses prevalent in internal conflicts 
are now among the most atrocious in the world. In 1996, 
there were 19 ongoing situations of internal violence around 
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the world in which 1,000 people or more were killed…The 
number of conflict-related deaths is only a small indication 
of the tremendous amount of suffering, displacement and 
devastation caused by conflicts. Assaults on the fundamental 
right to life are widespread -- massacres, indiscriminate 
attacks on civilians, executions of prisoners, starvation of 
entire populations... Women and girls are raped by soldiers 
and forced into prostitution, and children are abducted to 
serve as soldiers.... Homes, schools and hospitals are 
deliberately destroyed...The collapse of infrastructure and 
civic institutions undermines the range of civil, economic, 
political and social rights.”47  
Severe breaches of human rights committed during armed 
conflict have a negative impact not only on the direct victims 
but also on the communities wherein they are perpetrated. 
Communities traumatised by atrocious human rights abuses 
during conflict will arguably be animated by  a greater 
demand for revenge. This will render the resolution of the 
conflict more tortuous and  post-conflict normalisation more 
challenging. Memories of ethnic cleansing, rape, torture, 
wanton destruction of property and killing of civilians are 
likely to be enduring images, that become part of the group’s 
collective memory and which may continue to fuel hatred for 
generations. 
 This is why humanitarian law is an important aspect of 
the relationship between human rights and the conflict cycle. 
Legally, human rights law and humanitarian law are related 
but distinct branches of the law48. However, they are both  
                                                 
47 United Nations (n.d.) Human Rights and Conflict: A United Nations 
Priority. [Internet] Available from: 
<http://www.un.org/rights/HRToday/hrconfl.htm> 
48 In a nutshell the most basic distinction between human rights law and 
humanitarian law refers to their scope of application with human rights norms 
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protecting individuals in peacetime and humanitarian law rules protecting 
individuals in situations of armed conflict. 
grounded in the same values of human dignity and, I would 
argue,  taking a less legalistic approach is useful also in this 
context. International humanitarian law is a set of rules 
which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of 
armed conflict. It protects persons who are not, or are no 
longer, participating in the hostilities and restricts the means 
and methods of warfare. Thus humanitarian law attempts to 
regulate conflict and attenuate its worse effects, particularly 
on civilians,  which may render the transition from conflict 
to peace less problematic. Nevertheless international 
humanitarian law (IHL) is also facing a number of 
challenges. 
 
One of the main challenges being faced by international 
humanitarian law is that it developed as a series of norms 
designed to mitigate the effects of international armed 
conflict. Indeed the bulk of the rules of IHL refer to inter-
state conflict. The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which 
are considered to be the cornerstones of IHL, only regulate 
in a cursory fashion internal armed conflict in their common 
article 3. The rise of inter-state conflict has, to a considerable 
degree, found IHL unprepared. The international community 
has sought to remedy these lacunae by introducing 
international treaties which also regulate the means and 
methods of warfare in internal conflicts. One such example 
is the 1977 Additional Protocol 2 to the Four Geneva 
Conventions.  The difficulty in ensuring compliance with 
IHL inherent in the context of violent conflict is intensified 
in situations where the conflicting parties are not states but 
rather non-state actors such as guerrila groups etc. 
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This lack of compliance with IHL has also been a spur for 
the establishment of court-based systems to enforce its rules. 
Indeed the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
the International Tribunal for Rwanda and the International 
Criminal Court are all examples of courts designed to ‘end 
impunity’ for, inter alia, grave breaches of IHL (war 
crimes). This movement towards functioning enforcement 
mechanisms for IHL may also, as we shall see, prove to be 
an obstacle to conflict resolution. This is particularly the case 
where during the conflict rival groups have been accused of 
grave violations with the threat of prosecution pending. 
 
A different approach argues that the premise on which the 
edifice of humanitarian law is built, that of humanising war, 
is intself misguided and flawed. Rendering conflict more 
human may lead to its prolongation rather than its 
conclusion. This approach posits that conflict management 
of the kind undertaken under the auspices of humanitarian 
law is destined to be counter-productive by creating 
conditions of ‘acceptable levels of violence’. Such 
conditions, one may argue, are unlikely to create the 
momentum for  resolving the conflict and are more likely to 
drag out the armed conflict for a longer  period of time. 
Empirical research testing this hypothesis is not readily 
available, partly because testing whether parties are more or 
less likely to continue armed conflict with more or less 
observance of humanitarian law rules seems a venture reliant 
on too many variables. What is clear is that some conflicts, 
which have witnessed persistent violations of humanitarian 
law norms, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have been 
sad, long sagas. 
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Human rights and conflict resolution: creative tension? 
 
However long and intractable violent conflicts are, they 
will at some point be resolved. The crucial question in the 
context of this paper is whether human rights principles and 
values are obstacles or aids to conflict resolution.  This 
research question has attracted the most attention from 
scholars and practioners alike within the broader field of 
human rights and the conflict cycle. Interest in this specific 
issue of the relationship between conflict resolution and 
human rights emerged strongly within the context of the 
armed conflict in the Balkans in the early to mid 1990s. 
Mertus and Helsing suggest that an anonymous article in the 
Spring 1996 edition of the Human Rights Quarterly entitled 
Human Rights in Peace Negotiations was a trigger to serious 
debate in this field. Parlevliet also refers to this article as 
being ground-breaking in the discipline.  The article appears 
to argue that human rights activists were responsible for the 
prolongation of the Bosnian war and for the additional 
deaths and destruction such prolongation engendered. I 
would argue that the article is not the indictment of human 
rights most understand it to be.  Early on in their analysis the 
authors referred to criticisms levelled at several peace 
formulae devised throughout the Bosnian conflict. 
 
“Trenchant, therefore, were the voices that called for 
justice and retribution, and judged every blueprint for peace 
according to whether, in the eyes of the commentators, they 
rewarded “aggression” or ethnic cleansing”49 
 
The issue of “rewarding aggression”, to which the authors 
return at several points in the article is not, essentially, a 
                                                 
49 Anonymous. (1996)  Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, Human Rights 
Quarterly, Vol. 18, no.2, May,  p.250. 
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human rights issue. The concept of aggression and the legal 
consequences of aggression are matters of the international 
law of war or jus ad bellum.  The rules of international law 
governing aggression do oblige states not to recognise 
acquisition of territory acquired through aggression but this 
is certainly not a matter of human rights law or practice. 
 
There is then the point of rewarding ethnic cleansing 
which is a human rights issue. Human rights activists 
certainly cannot ignore or condone ethnic cleansing and 
massive violations of human rights. Indeed, in contemporary 
international law and politics the concept of humanitarian 
intervention and the responsibility to protect has emerged 
ever more strongly. The international community has thus 
taken on board the humanitarian imperative of protecting 
people from genocide and ethnic cleansing (vide Kosovo). It 
seems that, after all, the principle of not rewarding ethnic 
cleansing and indeed of stopping ethnic cleansing are matters 
upon which the United Nations and other organizations now 
agree. Be that as it may, it is not human rights activists who 
refused or rejected the numerous peace plans produced at 
various stages of the conflict. It was the parties to the 
conflict themselves who had the power and thus the 
responsibility to accept or reject peace deals. The 
responsibility for the prolongation of the war and the ensuing 
deaths thus rests squarely with them. In the same article 
President Clinton is quoted as saying, “Only the parties to 
this terrible conflict can end it.” Peace negotiators have a 
role as mediators, human rights advocates have a role too in 
documenting human rights violations and highlighting them 
(and also to promote human rights values and culture) while 
it is up to the parties to end any conflict. 
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In their Concluding Observations the authors state that: 
 
“[t]argeting violators of human rights and bringing them 
to justice is essential. Accusation, however, comes more 
easily than making peace. The quest for justice for 
yesterday’s victims of atrocities should not be pursued in 
such a manner that it makes today’s living the dead of 
tomorrow. That, for the human rights community, is one of 
the lessons from the former Yugoslavia.”50  What is, then, 
the lesson to be drawn from the Bosnian conflict for the 
human rights community? Is it that they should not comment 
on human rights violations during conflict? Is it that there 
should not be international tribunals established to punish 
violators of  human rights? Or is it that they should not 
criticise peace agreements? 
 
Answering each of these questions in turn, I would 
suggest that the raison d’etre of the human rights community 
is fundamentally twofold: documenting and highlighting 
human rights violations as well as promoting a human rights 
culture through education, understood in its broadest sense. 
It is therefore impossible to expect that the human rights 
community will not document and highlight human rights 
violations, especially systematic and massive abuses such as 
happened in Bosnia and elsewhere. That they should do so 
adhering to the most scrupulous standards of fairness and 
ethics is certainly an important condition to be fulfilled at all 
times. That such documentation  should also be done with 
sensitivity to time and context is also an important 
consideration. 
 
The establishment of the International Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia was a United Nations Security Council decision. 
                                                 
50 Ibid. p.258 
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Certainly the human rights community lobbied for the 
establishment of the tribunal but the decision to establish the 
tribunal  through a Security Council resolution was not a 
human rights community decision. Human rights activists 
lobby on many occasions, the Security Council rarely takes 
notice. Indeed Geoffrey Robertson argues that the creation of 
the ICTY “was conceived as a fig leaf to cover the UN’s 
early reluctance to intervene in the Balkans.”51 It is therefore 
difficult to ascertain what lesson the human rights 
community should draw from the Bosnian experience in this 
respect. The criticism in the article referred to Richard 
Goldstone who as Chief Prosecutor made certain statements 
which, the authors considered, imperilled the peace process. 
Without entering the merits of whether the ICTY was a good 
idea or not, the criticism made by the authors implies that 
Prosecutors and Judges in such tribunals ought to be careful 
and understand the delicacy of the context in which they are 
operating, not that such tribunals are, in themselves, an 
obstacle to peace. 
 
The final question I attempt to respond to is whether the 
Bosnian experience indicates that the human rights 
community should not criticise peace agreements. As noted 
earlier, whether or not to accept a peace agreement is the 
ultimate responsibility of the parties to the conflict. In 
situations of violent conflict the most immediate imperative 
is the ending of the violence. However, experience has 
demonstrated that peace agreements are processes rather 
than static legal instruments. Concentrating solely on the 
immediate cessation of violence, while ignoring longer term 
normalisation structures and procedures, including human 
rights concerns, may very well be counter-productive in the 
                                                 
51 Robertson, G. (2006) Crimes Against Humanity. 3rd ed. London, Penguin 
Books. 
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longer term. It would seem legitimate for the human rights 
community to call for the inclusion of human rights 
structures and processes within the agreement. At the same 
time criticisms of amnesties for crimes against humanity and 
genocide may be taken to risk destabilising peace processes 
and agreements. Nevertheless, the UN itself seems now to 
have taken this route. In fact then UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan instructed his personal representative to Sierra 
Leone  to append a reservation to his signature to the 
agreement stating that the UN did not subscribe to any 
amnesty granted through the agreement for persons accused 
of genocide etc. 
 
The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, rejected in his 
report to the UN Security Council the proposed amnesty: 
 
"As in other peace accords, many compromises were 
necessary in the Lome Peace Agreement. As a result, some of 
the terms which this peace has obtained, in particular the 
provisions on amnesty, are difficult to reconcile with the 
goal of ending the culture of impunity, which inspired the 
creation of the United Nations Tribunals for Rwanda and the 
Former Yugoslavia, and the future International Criminal 
Court. Hence the instruction to my Special Representative to 
enter a reservation when he signed the peace agreement 
stating that, for the United Nations, the amnesty cannot 
cover international crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law [.…]."52 
 
                                                 
52 United Nationals Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (1999) Seventh Report of 
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra 
Leone. 30 July. 
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Whatever the lessons for human rights advocates 
emanating from Bosnia, I would contend that lessons should 
be drawn from every conflict not just by the human rights 
community but more broadly, including by peace negotiators 
and conflict resolvers. 
 
One of the lessons that needs to be learned and re-learned 
within the scenario of violent conflict is how to deal with the 
legacy of massive and systematic human rights abuses. 
Dealing with such issues by keeping both the justice and 
peace perspectives is perhaps the most difficult issue to 
resolve in the complex relationship between human rights 
and conflict. The reference to ‘learning and re-learning’ is an 
especially important one in this context. The argument of 
human rights advocates is that grave human rights violations 
must not go unpunished for a number of reasons. Some of 
these reasons may be summarised thus: (i) if impunity 
prevails, those sections of the community who have suffered 
these grave human rights breaches will retain a sense of 
grievance, thus imperilling the long term peace (ii) the 
punishment of individuals guilty of grave human rights 
abuses may serve as a deterrent (iii) you cannot build a just 
society on a culture of impunity. Moreover, as illustrated by 
the example of the UN Secretary General’s stance vis-a-vis 
Sierra Leone, amnesties for genocide and crimes against 
humanity are increasingly illegal under international law.53 
 
On the other hand, insistence on prosecuting individuals 
within a conflict resolution context may certainly prove to be 
an obstacle in ensuring a cessation of hostilities.  A number 
                                                 
53 The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide establishes a legal duty on state parties to prosecute or extradite 
individuals accused of genocide. This probably is also a rule of customary 
international law.  
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of responses have been tentatively put forward in resolving 
this conundrum. Trials are the most legalistic responses and 
may take a variety of guises: domestic courts, hybrid courts 
and international tribunals. Truth Commissions seek to 
uncover the truth but are not prosecutorial devices.They are 
intended to allow truth to emerge as an antidote to denial (of 
human rights atrocities) and amnesia. One may contend that 
Truth Commissions are pschycological and sociological 
responses. Reparations are another instrument designed to 
acknowledge suffering and offering a financial compensation 
for such suffering. There are many other responses which, 
ultimately, may all be incomplete responses to massive 
atrocities and grave violations of human rights. Martha 
Minow comments that 
 
“Responses to collective violence lurch among rhetorics 
of history (truth), theology (forgiveness), justice 
(punishment, compensation and deterrence), therapy 
(healing), art (commendation and disturbance) and 
education (learning lessons). None is adequate.”54 
 
However, a combination of these responses may begin to 
allow communities and individuals to recognise themselves 
as human beings with rights and responsibilities. Such an 
understanding is ultimately what human rights are about: the 
value of human dignity that is at the core of human rights 
discourse as evidenced in the opening lines of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. These thoughts do not provide 
guidance as to which combination of resources to use and at 
which point in time to use them. Perhaps it is unwise to give 
any guidance since such decsions must rely heavily on the 
particularities of the conflict and the communities in which 
the conflict has existed. For example, some in South Africa 
                                                 
54 Op. cit. Minow (1998) p.147 
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question whether the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
would have been possible without the charisma of 
personalities such as Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu. 
Thus, personalities, histories, geographies and other local 
factors will all play a part in making these difficult choices. 
 
The time factor is also an important one; what may seem 
impossible early on in the post-conflict stage may be 
eminently do-able within a 10-20 year time frame. If one 
looks at the trajectory of post-Pinochet Chile one can see a 
vivid example of this. General Pinochet’s regime, having 
engaged in very grave violations of human rights towards 
political opponents, relinquished power in the early 1990s. 
He left the presidential office with amnesties, a seat for life 
in the Senate and other assurances. When Spanish and UK 
judicial authorities attempted to prosecute General Pinochet 
for crimes against humanity in 1998 the Chilean government 
objected in the strongest possible terms. Numerous 
politicians and opinion formers in Europe and elsewhere 
argued that these attempts at prosecuting Pinochet were 
undermining Chilean national reconciliation etc. It seemed 
impossible for justice and peace to cohabit in Chile. In 2000 
a Chilean Court stripped Pinochet of his immunity and at the 
time of his death he was still involved in legal wrangles 
relating to his period in power. Although Pinochet never 
faced justice, the change in such a short period of time is 
remarkable. This may be a salutary lesson to human rights 
activists engaged in work in post-conflict societies. While 
there are some who hold strictly to the view that justice 
delayed is justice denied, justice deferred may be the wisest 
course in certain contexts. 
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Human rights promotion as a stabilising and normalising 
factor in post-conflict societies 
 
Conflict resolution is mainly concerned with ending 
hostilities or putting an end to violence. In  Galtung’s 
terminology,  conflict resolvers primary role is to achieve 
negative peace i.e, absence of direct violence. In post-
conflict societies the main challenge that is faced by 
communities is to build positive peace by eliminating 
cultural and structural violence. In everyday terminology 
post-conflict societies need to re-build communities where 
the ‘us and them model’ of a divided society is replaced by 
an ‘all of us together’ model. Such an inclusive, pluralistic 
society necessarly eschews discrimination and provides a 
shared space and a shared experience. According to 
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall we end “structural 
violence by removing structural contradictions and injustices 
and cultural behaviour by changing attitudes”55 
 
In order to examine the role of human rights in societies 
which seek to end injustices and change attitudes it is 
necessary to revert to a reflection on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The first paragraph in the 
Preamble refers to  the premise that the “equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” The 
notion of equality (thus non-discrimination) and justice (thus 
the absence of injustice) and human rights are inextricably 
yoked together. In fact Article 1 of the Declaration postulates 
that individuals “should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood” as an essential prerequisite for the observance 
of human rights. Societies based on these tenets of equality, 
                                                 
55 Op. cit. Ramsbotham et al. (2005) p.11.  
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justice and brotherhood seem to fulfil the criteria for positive 
peace as defined by conflict analysts. 
 
Moving beyond issues of punishment and retribution, how 
do human rights structures and methods assist a society 
suffering from structural or cultural violence embark on a 
process of normalisation? From a purely perceptual 
perspective, the existence of human rights structures such as 
national human rights commissions may give comfort to 
those sectors of society which were at the receiving end of 
injustice. If these commissions are given adequate powers 
and resources and are staffed by competent individuals on a 
cross-community basis, they will give a sense of protection 
to communities who have lived long periods of 
discrimination. Moreover, if these national human rights 
institutions seek to reach out in a proactive manner to all 
sections of society they may serve a further perceptual 
purpose. This purpose is that of giving these sections of 
society a sense of political participation by having a stake in 
such public bodies. 
 
Human rights education, whether provided by national 
human rights commissions or by civil society, is another 
crucial contribution that human rights may provide to post-
conflict societies. The concept of human rights education as 
described by the UN General Assembly is particularly 
pertinent in this respect: 
 
“Human rights education should involve more than the 
provision of information and should constitute a 
comprehensive life-long process by which people at all levels 
in development and in all strata of society learn respect for 
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the dignity of others and the means and methods of ensuring 
that respect in all societies.”56 
 
If individuals within a given society understand that all 
members of that society possess a dignity that needs to be 
recognised and respected then the attitudinal changes 
required for ending cultural violence begin to appear 
possible. A crucial dimension of human rights education is 
the ‘values and dispositions’ aspect57. This dimension  
emphasises how individuals may gain experience of, develop 
and practice values and dispositions which are crucial to a 
just, democratic  and peaceful society which respects and 
promotes the human rights of all.  Among the values 
explored in this dimension are those of caring for yourself 
and for others together with a sense of responsibility and a 
sense of belonging. 
 
Another critical dimension in human rights education 
dwells in ‘ideas and understandings’  which focuses, among 
others, on the critical role of relationships, the relevance of 
compromise and negotiation, the concepts of democracy, 
citizenship, community and governance as well as cultural 
identities, conflicts and conciliations. The idea of the 
centrality of relationships exposes individuals to reflections 
on the need to foster economic, social, cultural and political 
relationships based on equality and reciprocity and an 
understanding that mutual benefits flow from such relations. 
In the context of peace and human rights an understanding of 
                                                 
56General Assembly United Nations (1994) Resolution 49/184 of 1994 United 
Nations Decade for Human Rights Education [Internet] Available from: 
<http://www.un-documents.net/a49r184.htm> 
57 This and subsequent points on human rights education are derived from the 
Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) publication prepared by 
the EMHRN Human Rights Education Working Group 2003:  Human Rights 
Education: a background paper to which the author has contributed. 
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compromise and negotiation is important as is the ability to 
identify what is essential and what is subsidiary. All of the 
above and other human rights education dimensions seem to 
be particularly apposite and urgent in post-conflict societies. 
 
Furthermore, with reference to the vexed issue of how to 
deal with a legacy of mass atrocities and secure a peaceful 
future, Minow argues that “deliberate programs of education, 
teaching materials, books, exhibits, and events for adults and 
children – all of these are vital responses to mass 
violence.”58 
 
The emphasis on human rights education, apart from its 
instrinsic value, which hopefully emerges from the above, 
also serves a further purpose. One may argue that this 
educational approach allows us to look at human rights 
within a broader perspective. The emphasis is not purely, or 
in some cases not even primarily, on legalistic and penal 
perspectives. Instead this approach presents human rights 
very much in the holistic spirit of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights which concludes its Preamble with a call 
which places human rights education at its core by enjoining: 
 
“Every individual and every organ of society, keeping this 
Declaration constantly in mind, [to] strive by teaching and 
education to promote respect for these rights and 
freedoms...” 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This short overview presented some of the points of 
intersection and interaction between human rights and the 
                                                 
58 Op. cit.  Minow  (1998) p.144 
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conflict cycle. The most significant ideas which, I hope, 
emerge from these points of intersection are that: 
 
(i) human rights need to be understood not merely within 
a legal normative context but also within a social, economic, 
cultural and specifically an educational one; and 
 
(ii) although there are points of tension between the legal 
normative dimension of human rights and particular stages 
of the conflict cycle, a holistic view of both human rights 
and the conflict cycle presents more complementarities than 
competition. 
 
Too much emphasis has been placed on the legalistic 
perspective of human rights with not enough attention paid 
to sociological and philosophical  aspects, including the 
values base and educational dimensions. This is not to deny 
the importance of the legal dimension but is rather an 
invitation to consider human rights in their broadest sense. In 
the context of the conflict cycle this is a particularly 
important consideration. As outlined above, violent conflicts, 
particularly identity-based inter-state conflicts, have at their 
core issues of structural injustices and  cultural prejudices. 
While legal safeguards guaranteeing equality and non-
discrimination are an essential tool for removing injustices, 
they may not suffice on their own. Other tools are required to 
buttress legal safeguards and ensure structural and 
behavioural change. Winning hearts and minds is not a 
matter for legislation alone. Human rights education has 
already been noted as one of these tools. Human rights 
education, in order to be effective in this respect, must not 
only focus on awareness-raising of rights and duties. Minow, 
quoting a civil society educationalist, remarks that: 
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“Education is too often teaching, not knowing; teaching 
cannot be just about facts, but must be about empathy, 
participation, finding common humanity, asking kids where 
does the hate come from, relevance.” 
 
In all of these contexts engaging with conflict analysts 
and resolvers is useful to the human rights community itself. 
By having to reflect on what contribution human rights 
approaches may provide to conflict studies, human rights 
advocates and educationalists are required to question their 
own assumptions and working methods. This may allow 
them to discover new avenues for working both in societies 
that are at peace, as well as in communities facing the threat, 
reality or legacy of violent conflict. 
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